Category Archives: West Virginia Concealed Carry Laws

What are your Second Amendment rights? Mostly the Fourth Amendment.

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Here’s a brief, but decently thorough, rundown on the current state of “Second Amendment rights” in the United States. Unfortunately, it involves much more than just pulling out your pocket sized booklet of the U.S. Constitution and reading the Second Amendment. This is the ammunition you need to debate, understand, and exercise, your Second Amendment rights. Of course, see the disclaimer lower right on the home page.

This is a broad topic, and it’s all up in the air, depending on where you live in the country, as you’ll see below. These are excerpts from the larger piece I’ve been working on, so I’ve left citations in where possible.

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Second Amendment Law?

Most of the federal constitutional law surrounding the possession and use of firearms, i.e., “Second Amendment law,” is actually the law of the “Search and Seizure” clause of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 

The reason for this is because the United States Supreme Court has been very slow-going to establish any Second Amendment rights whatsoever. Regardless of what we believe the Founders intended, and regardless of what we subjectively believe, or perhaps know, that the Second Amendment means, the federal judiciary has failed miserably – decade after decade – at interpreting the actual words written in the Bill of Rights. I don’t believe it was ever supposed to be that difficult. But it is.

Shall not be infringed . . . .

For instance, it has been interpreted that the Second Amendment, though fairly concise, actually has two different so-called clauses. The Second Amendment provides,

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

See U.S. Const. amend. II. 

Seems pretty straight forward, in light of the fact that in the late 18th century, every military age male was required to comply with militia duties, and was also required by law to provide his own musket, or rifle, as well as sufficient powder and lead. As an interesting aside, in the event that any poor sap among us were so poor and dejected that he could not afford his own firearm, including sufficient powder and lead, there was an early welfare-style system, where that individual could borrow one from the government’s stores, with a requirement that it be returned in working order at the end of the lease term. This was less preferable to being able to use your own stuff. For example, Virginia’s Militia Act, enacted May 5, 1777, was very specific:

Every officer and soldier shall appear at his respective muster-field by eleven o’clock in the forenoon, armed or accoutred as follows: The county lieutenant, colonels, lieutenant colonels, and major, with a sword; every captain and lieutenant with a firelock and bayonet, a cartouch box, a sword, and three charges of powder and ball; every ensign with a sword; every non-commissioned officer and private with a rifle and tomahawk, or good firelock and bayonet, with a pouch and horn, or a cartouch or cartridge box, and with three charges of powder and ball; and, moreover, each of the said officers and soldiers shall constantly keep one pound of powder and four pounds of ball, to be produced whenever called for by his commanding officer.

If any soldier be certified to the court martial to be so poor that he cannot purche such arms, the said court shall cause them to be procured at the expense of the publick, to be reimbursed out of the fines on the delinquents of the county, which arms shall be delivered to such poor person to be used at musters, but shall continue the property of the county; and if any soldier shall sell or conceal such arms, the seller or concealer, and purchaser, shall each of them forfeit the sum of six pounds. And on the death of such poor soldier, or his removal out of the county, such arms shall be delivered to his captain, who shall make report thereof to the next court martial, and deliver the same to such other poor soldier as they shall order.

And if any poor soldier shall remove out of the county, and carry his arms with him, he shall incur the same penalty as if he had sold such arms; and if any persons concerned in selling or concealing such arms shall be sued for the said penalty, and upon conviction and recovery shall fail to make payment, he shall suffer such corporal punishment as the court before whom the recovery shall be shall think fit, not exceeding thirty nine lashes.

Militia or Individuals?

However, fast forward to 2008, long after the militia system has fallen into disuse and obscurity, in the case of District of Columbia v. Heller , the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the Second Amendment is now officially divided into a prefatory clause (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, …”) and an operative clause (“… the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). See Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). 

The Heller majority rejected the proposition that, because of its prefatory clause (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, …”), the Second Amendment “protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with militia service.” Id. So the militia part, which is often the center of much internet argument, is actually minor to the litigation.  Rather, the Court determined that, by its operative clause (“… the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”), the Second Amendment guarantees, still today, as of 2008, “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” Id. at 592, 128 S.Ct. 2783. 

The Court also explained that the operative clause “fits perfectly” with the prefatory clause, in that creating the individual right to keep and bear arms served to preserve the militia that consisted of self-armed citizens at the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification. Id. at 598, 128 S.Ct. 2783; Kolbe v.  Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 131-132 (4th Cir. 2017). That’s the overly-complicated way of saying that the people were the militia in the 1790s, and were guaranteed the right to keep their own weapons in case they needed to fight with them.

What is “Second Amendment law?”

This has created a body of law – Second Amendment law – which is amazingly one-sided, as far as the government is concerned, and extremely weak for the individual citizen.  As Professor J. Richard Broughton noted in what is one of the best law review articles I’ve reviewed, Danger at the Intersection of Second and Fourth, from the Idaho Law Review, September 2018:

[U]nder federal law alone, for example, numerous restrictions exist on gun possession: felons, those who have been adjudicated as a mental defective or who have ever been commit- ted to a mental institution, unlawful drug users or addicts, persons who have been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces, illegal aliens, and others. It is a crime to knowingly receive a firearm with an obliterated or altered serial number. It is a crime to possess a machine gun. It is a crime for a minor to possess a firearm, except under limited conditions. Violent crimes, or drug trafficking crimes, committed with a firearm are subject to enhanced punishments. And similar restrictions on possession and use of guns exist in state law. 

Id. at 399-400.  So, as lofty as the Second Amendment sounds, and as much as it is used in speech referencing the God-given right to keep and bear arms, etc., etc., in practice, and in reality, it has been chiseled away through the years, and has been long established as inapplicable to entire groups of individuals who might want to assert it, but who in reality have no recognized Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. At least not that the federal courts recognize.

As for Heller itself, the landmark Second Amendment case only provides for a Second Amendment right for gun possession in one’s home. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632, 635. To extend the Second Amendment beyond the home, which it obviously should to those of us who can read, one must look elsewhere at the lower federal courts, specific state laws, or wait until the Supreme Court takes up the issue of the expansion of the Second Amendment beyond the home. 

The expansion issue has been extremely limited in the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124 (D.D. Cir. 2016); see also Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 18–21 (2015) (discussing recent cases which suggest that gun rights may be gaining traction). 

In the dwindling number of jurisdictions where legislator continue to support strict gun regulation, judges, rather than politicians, spearhead the gun-rights movement . . . .

The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to possess “individualized suspicion” of a crime prior to conducting any search or seizure. When police try to preempt violent crime by stopping (i.e., seizing) armed citizens, the assumed violation of municipal gun laws supplies the requisite Fourth Amendment authority. As gun carrying becomes both lawful and common, even in major cities, police lose the ability to invoke public gun possession as a Fourth-Amendment-satisfying basis for investigation.

Bellin at 3 (citing U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (stating that “some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure”).

The Fourth Circuit (WV, VA, MD, NC, SC) Has Declined to Extend Heller outside the home

The Fourth Circuit has expressly declined to resolve whether the right recognized by Heller extends beyond the home.  United States  v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Footnote 2 of U.S. v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (noting that they continue to decline to address the issue of extending Heller beyond the home, and noting a split of sister circuits on the issue). 

But the 7th Circuit (Ill., IN, Wis.), and the DC Circuit have extended Heller outside the home

Both the 7th Circuit and the DC Circuit have made such an extension. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the “right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense … implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home”); see also Palmer v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.3d 173, 181–82 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that Second Amendment right recognized in Heller extends beyond home).

The 9th Circuit (CA, AZ, AK, ID) says Heller doesn’t extend outside the home

However, other courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have expressly found no extension exists. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 940 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public.” (emphasis added)); Young v. Hawaii, 911 F.Supp.2d 972, 990 (D. Haw. 2012) (“[L]imitations on carrying weapons in public do[ ] not implicate activity protected by the Second Amendment.”); Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167, 1178 (Md. 2011) (holding that regulations on carrying firearms outside the home are “outside of the scope of the Second Amendment, as articulated in Heller and McDonald”). 

McDonald v. Chicago (2010): The Second Amendment DOES apply to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment

When I took constitutional law classes in college, and again in law school, the professors made it a point to teach that the Second Amendment “does not apply to the states.” They made sure to inform you of that fact.  And for most of our history, that has been the position of the judiciary. However, that changed with the U.S. Supreme Court case of McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), which officially issued the holding that the Second Amendment applies, not only to the federal government, but also to the states. In other words, it restricts the state governments, and their political subdivisions, from some level of interference with the right to own and/or possess a gun. 

Thus, much of the body of constitutional law created in the 20th century, and in recent years, technically runs through the Fourteenth Amendment. It’s confusing, but such was the holding of McDonald. Through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, so did the Second Amendment then apply to restrict the states, just as Congress was initially restricted.  The important result here, is that all those professors were wrong – though no doubt they very much want Heller reversed by some future version of the Court. Of course the Second Amendment applies to individuals.  If states can’t violate the Fourth Amendment, it would be completely illogical to argue that states can violate the Second. Political ideology should be irrelevant to Constitutional interpretation, but it’s not.

McDonald specifically rejected the view that the Second Amendment “should be singled out for special–and specially unfavorable–treatment.” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). In addition, the Court also touched on the possible impact on States:  As with any incorporated provision of the Bill of Rights, “The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table [for States].”  Id., 561 U.S. 742, 790.

But restrictions will still be allowed

Legislatures can still enact restrictions on firearms inside the home, as illustrated by the Fourth Circuit allowing the “assault weapon” ban in Maryland, or as in the case of persons prohibited by virtue of being a felon, etc., which were unaffected by Heller, and which have been upheld many times. See Kolbe v.  Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 131-132 (4th Cir. 2017) (Upholding the MD ban) And if the Supreme Court does end up extending the Second Amendment beyond the home, restrictions are still going to be viable, depending on the analysis adopted by any such opinion. An actual Second Amendment analysis gets really confusing, and is beyond the scope of this post. But read the Kolbe decision and you’ll get the gist of how it can go.

Terry v. Ohio and the “Terry Search”

Perhaps the main collision between the Second Amendment and the Fourth, is one of the most famous cases of the 20th century, and probably the one case that any police officer in the United States can quote, in parts, verbatim: Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry was a 1968 Supreme Court case which came down during the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren. Professor Broughton discussed some interesting background on the case in his law review article, which provides context – both in why it was decided the way it was, and why it perhaps should now be sufficiently reigned in.

Terry provides the foundation for the often-used “Terry Search,” which is generally-speaking, when a police officer can make a limited search of a subject he is interacting with, where the subject isn’t yet under arrest necessarily, where probable cause for arrest has not been established, but where there’s some legitimate danger that the subject could be armed and dangerous to the police officer.

This is sometimes referred to as a “Terry Frisk,” or even a “Terry Sweep.” There’s a mountain of caselaw since 1968, from the Supreme Court, every federal circuit, and every state in the land, interpreting just what Terry means, and what it allows; and what it doesn’t allow. As Jeffrey Bellin points out in The Right to Remain Armed, at p. 11, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 18–21 (2015) it’s a subjective field:

Police often detect guns through public observation. Officers patrol the streets alert to signs of gun possession, such as bulges under clothing or protruding handles. The late Jack Maple, a key Bratton deputy, describes in his memoir how he taught himself to “spot people carrying guns” so he could “save a few lives” by getting the guns off the street. Maple explained the “drill” as follows: after seeing a suspicious bulge, he would make his “first move by grabbing the handle of [the suspect’s] gun. [The suspect] freezes and usually obeys an order to put his hands on his head. If he doesn’t, my hold on his gun and waistband put him off-balance, so I can spin him around and get cuffs on him anyway., Maple bragged that as a patrol officer, he would “stop two or three people a day who were carrying concealed weapons.’

The Courts Continue to Extend Terry, While Red States Continue to Liberalize Gun Rights

Recent federal appellate opinions from the lower federal courts, especially one from the Fourth Circuit, which we’ll discuss, have created an anxious uncertainty about where the Terry line of judicial law is headed in the future. This is “unknown, and unknowable,” given the nationwide trend of liberalization of gun laws of pretty much every “reddish” state in the country – especially West Virginia. Courts are beginning to clash with state legislatures in the levels of trust and freedom they’re willing to grant presumptively law-abiding citizens.

Ideally, Terry’s direction ought to head towards the “liberalization” of individual freedom and liberty, along with gun rights, in the states who’s legislatures are choosing to do so.  Those states, and their citizens, such as West Virginia, where “Mountaineers are Always Free” (Montani Semperi Liberi – the State Motto), understand that such trust and freedom was the intention of the Founders in creating and ratifying the Second Amendment.  

The Founders wanted to ensure that the citizens of the states would not be infringed from possession of arms by the federal government. The perceived problem at that time was federal tyranny. Why would the states give up their sovereign status, protected by their citizens via militia membership, and join this federal government, if the federal government could disarm them and have their way with them thereafter?

The Fourth Amendment White-Knight’s the Second Amendment

Since the Second Amendment itself doesn’t extend beyond the home, if at all, in the eyes of the judiciary, you’re generally only going to be protected by the Fourth Amendment, when in possession of a firearm outside the home. If you leave your house with a gun, whether walking, or driving, and whether carrying a firearm concealed, or carrying a firearm openly, the only real protection available is the Fourth Amendment. The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Like the Second Amendment, the strongest protections under the Fourth Amendment apply in the home, where generally, even from English common law, a man’s home is his castle. This is the origin of the so-called “Castle Doctrine” statutes which were enacted throughout the country in recent years.

In the Home: No Warrant? Presumptively Illegal

Searches and seizures which take place in a person’s home are presumptively unreasonable, which means they are illegal by default according to the Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, outside a person’s home, Fourth Amendment protections only apply where there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” See, e.g., United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 2013) (Generally no reasonable expectation of privacy in property that is held by a third party). 

Outside the Home: No Warrant? No Need unless REP

To the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court has found that no presumption exists outside the home, because a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for most “places” outside one’s own home. These unprotected “places” include bank accounts (United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)), curbside trash (California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)), “open fields,” surrounding one’s home (Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)), and so on. 

However, use of police dogs to investigate a home and its immediate surroundings is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). As does GPS surveillance of a vehicle traveling on public roads. U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012). Future changes are likely in the areas of cell phones, emails, tablets, and other similar devices. Changes are also likely in the area of videotaping police officers in public areas.

Outside the home, you generally aren’t dealing with search warrants, though you may have arrest warrants.  In public places, you’re mostly dealing with “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause.” Reasonable suspicion is the standard which is required to be met before a police officer can initiate a stop. 

What is Reasonable Suspicion? First answer whether you’re in a car, or walking down the street….

A “stop” could be a traffic stop, or it could be a “detention” on the street, or some type of pedestrian encounter. It’s not easy to define what reasonable suspicion is, but you generally see these two scenarios. Either you have a traffic stop of a vehicle, or you have a pedestrian encounter. Both occur in public – so outside the highly protected castle of the Fourth Amendment, the home. Both contain very low protections for the individual, and have very high degrees of power to the police. 

Gun rights are mostly a conglomerate of hundreds, if not thousands, of criminal prosecutions, analyzing motions to suppress what are alleged to be illegal searches and/or seizures

Each of these scenarios has vastly different consequences for gun rights. And each of these bring hundreds, if not thousands of different cases, around the country, and within states, describing what police officers can do, and what they cannot do, based on different factual circumstances. Many of those pertain to firearms.  And almost none of them are going to discuss the Second Amendment itself. But they do generally involve the concept of being armed for the purpose of self defense – really the central component of the Second Amendment.

IMPORTANT FEDERAL CASES ON GUN RIGHTS OUTSIDE OF THE HOME:

U.S. v. Robinson (2017): a Fourth Circuit case holding that being an occupant in a car, with a gun, makes you “armed and dangerous” as a matter of law

We can really skip ahead a few decades in the endless litigation of reasonable suspicion and Terry v. Ohio and arrive at the current predicament upon which we’ve arrived. In 2017, the Fourth Circuit took a giant chunk out of gun rights, by issuing the “en banc” opinion (which means the entire court of appellate judges on the Fourth Circuit, rather than the usual random three judge panel) of U.S. v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). 

The majority opinion concluded categorically that the presence of a firearm on a subject, or within reach of the subject, makes that person dangerous, by virtue of being armed with a dangerous weapon. This applies objectively, and does not require any articulable facts by the police officer of some other reason why the person was dangerous. Robinson, 846 F.3d at 699. This is also one of those cases where the separate opinions are perhaps just as important as the majority opinion. For West Virginians specifically, and probably those in North Carolina, Judge Black specifically discusses in his dissent, the potential danger of the majority’s reasoning for Fourth Amendment violations in open carry states:

In my view, states have every right to address these pressing safety concerns with generally applicable and evenhanded laws imposing modest burdens on all citizens who choose to arm themselves in public. For instance, many states—though not West Virginia— seek to reconcile police safety and a right to public carry through “duty to inform” laws, requiring any individual carrying a weapon to so inform the police whenever he or she is stopped,4 or in response to police queries.  And if a person fails to disclose a suspected weapon to the police as required by state law, then that failure itself may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, justifying a protective frisk.

West Virginia, however, has taken a different approach, permitting concealed carry without the need for disclosure or temporary disarmament during traffic stops. For the reasons described above, I do not believe we may deem inherently “dangerous” any West Virginia citizen stopped for a routine traffic violation, on the sole ground that he is thought to have availed himself fully of those state-law rights to gun possession. 

Nor, in my view, does the Fourth Amendment allow for a regime in which the safety risks of a policy like West Virginia’s are mitigated by selective and discretionary police spot-checks and frisks of certain legally armed citizens, by way of pretextual stops or otherwise. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (invalidating discretionary spot-checks of drivers for licenses and registrations in furtherance of roadway safety). Absent some “specific, articulable suspicion of danger” in a particular case, see United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 168–69 (4th Cir. 1998), West Virginia’s citizens, including its police officers, must trust their state’s considered judgment that the benefits of its approach to public gun possession outweigh the risks. See Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133. . . .

That is particularly so given that West Virginia does not require that people carrying firearms inform the police of their guns during traffic or other stops, even if asked. See supra at 50. Where a state has decided that gun owners have a right to carry concealed weapons without so informing the police, gun owners should not be subjected to frisks because they stand on their rights. Cf. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1132 (“impropriety” of officer’s demand to see permit for gun being brandished in public is “particularly acute” where state has not only legalized open carry of firearms but also “does not require gun owners to produce or even carry their licenses for inquiring officers”). Under a different legal regime, different inferences could be drawn from a failure to answer an officer’s question about a gun. See [Northrup] at 50–11. But I do not think we may presume dangerousness from a failure to waive—quickly enough—a state-conferred right to conceal a weapon during a police encounter.

Again, I recognize that expanded rights to openly carry or conceal guns in public will engender genuine safety concerns on the part of police officers, as well as other citizens, who more often will find themselves confronting individuals who may be armed.

But where a sovereign state has made the judgment that its citizens safely may arm themselves in public, I do not believe we may presume that public gun possession gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, no matter what the neighborhood. And because the rest of the circumstances surrounding this otherwise unremarkable traffic stop do not add appreciably to the reasonable suspicion calculus, I must conclude that the police were without authority to frisk Robinson under Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard.

United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 714, 716 (2017) (emphasis added).

The reality: less gun rights in a car; more as a pedestrian.

The result is, if you are in possession of a firearm inside a vehicle, and therefore subject to a traffic stop, you can be subjected to a Terry search, and disarmed, even if you did nothing wrong at all, assuming it was a legal traffic stop in the first place.  And of course, assuming the officer has knowledge that you’re armed. To the contrary, when in public, but not inside a vehicle, it’s not going to be as easy to find yourself in a situation where you are “seized” by a police officer, and thus not free to go, prior to the officer obtaining knowledge that you’re armed.  Moreover, the holding of U.S. v. Robinson did not extend to pedestrian encounters. So a pedestrian, as of now, is still controlled under the 2013 holding of U.S. v. Black, another Fourth Circuit opinion, which protects the open carry of firearms in open carry states.

United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013).

Writing for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013), Judge Gregory wrote that:

Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status. More importantly, where a state permits individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, cannot justify an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). Here, Troupe’s lawful display of his lawfully possessed firearm cannot be the justification for Troupe’s detention. See St. John v. McColley, 653 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M.2009) (finding no reasonable suspicion where the plaintiff arrived at a movie theater openly carrying a holstered handgun, an act which is legal in the State of New Mexico.) That the officer had never seen anyone in this particular division openly carry a weapon also fails to justify reasonable suspicion. From our understanding of the laws of North Carolina, its laws apply uniformly and without exception in every single division, and every part of the state. Thus, the officer’s observation is irrational and fails to give rise to reasonable suspicion. To hold otherwise would be to give the judicial imprimatur to the dichotomy in the intrusion of constitutional protections. 

Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department, (6th Cir. 2015): a non-categorical, individual-specific Terry stop

Between Black and Robinson, the Sixth Circuit issued the opinion in Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Department, 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015), which completely rejected the categorical method adopted by the majority in Robinson, and instead applied an individual and particularized approach of distinguishing between one who is “armed,” and one who is “dangerous,” based on the actual facts of the situation. The case involved a man going for a walk with his wife, daughter, grandson, while walking a dog, and while armed with a handgun openly carried on his hip. During the walk, there was a verbal altercation of sorts with a passerby, who told Mr. Northup, “you can’t walk around with a gun like that,” and who then called 911 to report the gun being openly carried by Mr. Northup.

When the case eventually made its way to the Sixth Circuit, Judge Sutton wrote an opinion highly supportive of individual liberty in the open carry context. In response to the officer’s alleged fear that Mr. Northrup could have started suddenly shooting people, which I’ve commonly encountered in my practice, Judge Sutton wrote that the officer should have engaged Mr. Northrup in a conversation before determining whether he was dangerous. He wrote that absent reasonable suspicion of Mr. Northrup being dangerous, the officer’s fear, or “hope” that Mr. Northrup wouldn’t start shooting, “remains another word for the trust that Ohioans have placed in their State’s approach to gun licensure and gun possession: “[W]hile open carry laws may put police officers (and some motorcyclists) in awkward situations from time to time, the Ohio legislature has decided its citizens may be entrusted with firearms on public streets.

United States v. Leo: a Seventh Circuit restriction on gun searches

A police officer in Racine, Wisconsin, was driving an unmarked car when he spotted two young men in black hoodies standing on the sidewalk. As he drove by, he saw the men running into the yard of a nearby duplex. Shortly after this, the police officer heard the dispatcher relay that a 911 call was received, reporting a suspected burglary in process in the exact duplex unit he had last seen one of the suspects.  The description of the suspects described the suspects as “two Hispanic men wearing black hoodies, one of them with a gun, possibly a revolver.” The dispatcher also relayed that the 911 caller had also reported an unmarked police car pass by. United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015).

Police later stopped Mr. Leo after he left, heading towards a local Head Start program. He was handcuffed, and having information there would be a gun in the backpack, the backpack was searched, where drugs, as well as the firearm, were found. The purported justification was a search under Terry. However, since the gun was suspected to be in the backpack, and since it was no longer accessible to Mr. Leo, who was handcuffed, was there justification under Terry?

The officers, or at least their lawyers, also argued that Mr. Leo was heading towards the Head Start school with a gun, which justified the backpack search. However, the Seventh Circuit noted that the Head Start program was not a “school” under Wisconsin law, and as such, carrying a gun there wouldn’t have been a violation of federal or state “gun-free school zone laws.” Moreover, the concealed carry laws in Wisconsin limits the rights of convicted felons or persons under the age of twenty one. However, the officers did not know Leo’s age or criminal history – nor did they inquire. 

The Court noted that Seventh Circuit precedent permits public carry of a firearm, pursuant to the Second Amendment. Therefore, the Court rejected the officers’ justification for the search, without a sufficient articulation of probable cause. The Court held that the liberalization of state gun laws, along with Heller and McDonald, required probable cause before searching Mr. Leo:

[C]onsidering thee important developments in Second Amendment law together with Wisconsin’s gun laws,” the court was compelled to reject the Government’s justification for search without establishing probable cause.

Broughton, at 394 Danger at the Intersection of Second and Fourth, from the Idaho Law Review, September 2018.

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)

The U.S. Supreme Court declined to recognize a “firearm exception” to the requirements justifying a Terry search in a case dealing with an anonymous tip alleging an illegal gun would be found on the target of the anonymous tip. The Court’s reasoning was grounded upon the reliability inquiries attending anonymous tips, rather than the issue of whether the mere possession of a firearm alone can establish a per se basis for an investigative detention.

A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as amicus is, in essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a ‘firearm exception.’ . . . We decline to adopt this position.

See J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000)

United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2000)

Another anonymous tip case, from the Third Circuit, arising out of the Virgin Islands. An anonymous tip was received that Mr. Ubiles possessed a firearm at a public event, but there was no indication or information that he was engaged in, nor planning to engage in, illegal activity. The Court held that mere possession of a lawful object does not entitle a police officer to infer criminal activity in the absence of reasonable, articulable suspicion. Ubiles at 218.

The Court analogized the situation to the lawful possession of a wallet. The wallet may, or may not, contain counterfeit bills. The mere possibility of it having counterfeit bills, likewise would not entitle a police officer to infer their presence in the wallet.

To be continued…..

 

 

The Walker Open Carry Case Turns Into a Fight Over the “AR-15”

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UPDATE 2/5/20: Here’s our reply to the defense theory of Anti-AR-15:

Central to the Reply is newly discovered evidence. The defendant police officers argued to the Court that even though there’s no indication of it from the video, they actually weren’t checking to see if Michael Walker was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm, but rather that he was a potential school shooter, because it was “morning,” and a school some undetermined distance down that road was “in session.”

Well, the video was originally broadcasted on Facebook Live. Somebody was able to go back and screenshot it, and as it turns out – oops – it was actually 6:00 p.m…. I guess that explains the crickets around the 2:50 mark on the video.

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So, here’s the response we received from Putnam County in response to our pretrial motion asking the Court to stop the Putnam County deputies from presenting anti-AR-15 propaganda and irrelevant media reports of mass shootings at the jury trial in the Michael Walker Open Carry case.

Here was my last update, wherein I posted our motion to exclude the unrelated matters from trial, if you haven’t been following along.

This response is an outrageous attack on the Second Amendment, which ironically was filed by lawyers for West Virginia’s first so-called “Second Amendment Sanctuary” county – Putnam County.  Yesterday we all appeared at the federal courthouse in Huntington, West Virginia, for the pretrial hearing on various motions, including this one.

It was almost surreal to hear the other side argue to the Court that by virtue of the fact that Michael was safely carrying a completely legal AR-15 style rifle, in a non-threatening manner, that police should be able to search and seize him just because the AR is the “preferred weapon of mass shooters,” and so on.  Citing news media reports about the Parkland shooting.  They actually argued in court, that it would not have been suspicious if he had a shotgun, or a handgun.  It was mentioned that AR-15s aren’t used for hunting in West Virginia.  Which is of course completely false, and besides the point.

This is a reality check for people who value the Second Amendment, as well as the Fourth Amendment.  If you live in the Fourth Circuit: West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, or South Carolina, unless there’s a SCOTUS opinion on point, your constitutional interpretation/law comes from the Fourth Circuit. We’re on the edge….

Right now U.S. v. Black (2013), written by a federal appellate judge who is a staunch defender of the Second Amendment, Judge Gregory, whom I’ve had the honor of arguing in front of, protects citizens who open carry firearms in open carry states.  The police cannot harass you, detain you, search you, seize you, just by virtue of the fact you have a firearm. As we know from the past, that was the original purpose of gun control measures in many of the southern states, such as North Carolina (which is where US v. Black came out of).

Black was narrowed by US v. Robinson in 2017, which said that anyone in a vehicle lawfully stopped for whatever traffic violation, or pre textual reason whatsoever, can be disarmed and searched, because firearm possession automatically makes you dangerous.   Judge Gregory wrote an amazing dissent in that en banc opinion, which specifically mentions this scenario as it pertains to West-by-God-Virginia. However, that wasn’t extended to open carriers who are not already legitimately subjected to a forced encounter with police.  Well, they’re now trying to extend this to open carriers through anti-AR-15 propaganda.

If they succeed, guess what can happen next time thousands of open carriers bring their ARs to the state capitol in peaceful protest and free speech?  It’s game on if law enforcement wants to disarm you, run your background checks, search your pockets, etc. As Judge Gregory warned in the Robinson case dissent:

In my view, states have every right to address these pressing safety concerns with generally applicable and evenhanded laws imposing modest burdens on all citizens who choose to arm themselves in public. For instance, many states—though not West Virginia— seek to reconcile police safety and a right to public carry through “duty to inform” laws, requiring any individual carrying a weapon to so inform the police whenever he or she is stopped,4 or in response to police queries.5 And if a person fails to disclose a suspected weapon to the police as required by state law, then that failure itself may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, justifying a protective frisk.

West Virginia, however, has taken a different approach, permitting concealed carry without the need for disclosure or temporary disarmament during traffic stops. For the reasons described above, I do not believe we may deem inherently “dangerous” any West Virginia citizen stopped for a routine traffic violation, on the sole ground that he is thought to have availed himself fully of those state-law rights to gun possession. Nor, in my view, does the Fourth Amendment allow for a regime in which the safety risks of a policy like West Virginia’s are mitigated by selective and discretionary police spot-checks and frisks of certain legally armed citizens, by way of pretextual stops or otherwise. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (invalidating discretionary spot-checks of drivers for licenses and registrations in furtherance of roadway safety). Absent some “specific, articulable suspicion of danger” in a particular case, see United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 168–69 (4th Cir. 1998), West Virginia’s citizens, including its police officers, must trust their state’s considered judgment that the benefits of its approach to public gun possession outweigh the risks. See Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133.

. . .

That is particularly so given that West Virginia does not require that people carrying firearms inform the police of their guns during traffic or other stops, even if asked. See supra at 50. Where a state has decided that gun owners have a right to carry concealed weapons without so informing the police, gun owners should not be subjected to frisks because they stand on their rights. Cf. Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1132 (“impropriety” of officer’s demand to see permit for gun being brandished in public is “particularly acute” where state has not only legalized open carry of firearms but also “does not require gun owners to produce or even carry their licenses for inquiring officers”). Under a different legal regime, different inferences could be drawn from a failure to answer an officer’s question about a gun. See supra at 50–11. But I do not think we may presume dangerousness from a failure to waive—quickly enough—a state-conferred right to conceal a weapon during a police encounter.

Again, I recognize that expanded rights to openly carry or conceal guns in public will engender genuine safety concerns on the part of police officers, as well as other citizens, who more often will find themselves confronting individuals who may be armed.

But where a sovereign state has made the judgment that its citizens safely may arm themselves in public, I do not believe we may presume that public gun possession gives rise to a reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, no matter what the neighborhood. And because the rest of the circumstances surrounding this otherwise unremarkable traffic stop do not add appreciably to the reasonable suspicion calculus, I must conclude that the police were without authority to frisk Robinson under Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard.

Accordingly, I dissent.

United States v. Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 714, 716 (2017).

Don’t forget that Heller, i.e., the Second Amendment, has not yet been extended outside one’s home. It hasn’t been applied to open carry yet, or anywhere outside the home in the Fourth Circuit – nor by SCOTUS. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011), other courts are divided on the question, compare Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the “right to keep and bear arms for personal self-defense … implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home”); Palmer v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.3d 173, 181–82 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding that Second Amendment right recognized in Heller extends beyond home), with Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 940 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect the right of a member of the general public to carry concealed firearms in public.” (emphasis added)); Young v. Hawaii, 911 F.Supp.2d 972, 990 (D. Haw. 2012) (“[L]imitations on carrying weapons in public do[ ] not implicate activity protected by the Second Amendment.”); Williams v. State, 417 Md. 479, 10 A.3d 1167, 1178 (Md. 2011) (holding that regulations on carrying firearms outside the home are “outside of the scope of the Second Amendment, as articulated in Heller and McDonald“).

So, are Montani Semper Liberi, or not? It remains to be seen. Right now, definitely not in Putnam County. And if they get their way, neither here, nor our neighbors in Virginia, and below…..

Update on the Walker Case (Fourth Amendment Open Carry Lawsuit)

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In case you’re following along with the Walker v. Donahoe, et al. Fourth Amendment open carry civil rights lawsuit, we have a jury trial scheduled for February 19, beginning at 8:30 a.m. at the federal courthouse in Huntington, West Virginia. As of right now it’s still on.  Both sides have asked the court for summary judgment, which basically means that both sides claim to have the law completely on their side.  The court has not ruled as of yet. Pretrial documents have been submitted, including motions in limine, which are trial issues anticipated by the parties, which are best argued prior to the start of the trial.  If you haven’t seen the video of the incident in dispute, here it is:

The defendants are seeking to exclude portions of this video showing the “investigatory detention” of Michael Walker by the Putnam County Sheriff’s Department.  Not surprisingly, they want the part of the video where the police officer calls Michael a “co*ksucker,” repeatedly, among other things to be kept away from the jury.  Here’s their argument:

Also not surprisingly, we strongly disagree.  Here’s our response.  The judge will decide at some point, and generally has the broad discretion to control the flow of what the jury gets to see, and what they don’t:

We also filed a few motions in limine of our own, including our attempt at stopping the defendants from bringing up the Parkland school shooting, which they have announced is their attention, and which has absolutely nothing to do with the case.  They are also seeking to make the case that because Michael had an AR-15 style rifle, that a reasonable officer could suspect him of being a potential school shooter, or something to that effect.  Which is of course highly offensive, and antithetical to both the Fourth Amendment and the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:

In case you’re curious about the current status of laws pertaining to the open carrying of firearms in West Virginia, check out the last post I did on it.  It should still be the same. Of course, this case could change that if it doesn’t go our way…..

Episode 1 of the JOHN BRYAN PODCAST – impeachment, constitutional law, gun laws, self defense laws, and glucose meters are screwed up….

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https://www.podbean.com/eu/pb-tqqbg-cb4067

Check out Episode 1 of the John Bryan PODCAST, where I pontificate on several topics, including impeachment evidence we’ve supposedly been hearing about, some search and seizure issues pertaining to the open carry of firearms, some self defense firearms issues, and a really crazy discovery that generic brand blood glucose meters, used by diabetics, are apparently way, way off……

 

West Virginia Gun Laws – July 2019

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I’m seeing more and more confusing regarding West Virginia’s gun laws as of 2019.  Here is a quick rundown of some important things every West Virginian should know:

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“Constitutional Carry”

West Virginia recognizes the right of United States Citizens, or Legal Residents of the United States, who are 21 years of age or older, and who are not otherwise prohibited under state or federal law from possessing a firearm, to carry a concealed weapon in West Virginia without first obtaining a concealed carry license.  This is known as “Constitutional Carry,” in this, as well as other freedom-loving states.

This allows qualified persons to carry any “deadly weapon,” not just a pistol/revolver, like the old permit process allowed.  What can be carried concealed under constitutional carry?

A “deadly weapon” is generally deemed as “an instrument which is designed to be used to produce serious bodily injury or death or is readily adaptable to such use.” W. Va. Code § 61-7-2(9). It includes, but is not limited to, knives, switchblades, metallic knuckles, pistols, revolvers, and blackjacks. W. Va. Code § 61-7-2. Other items will be considered a “deadly weapon” for purposes of this statute where the circumstances of a particular case demonstrate that the weapon was “dangerous or deadly.” See Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Choat, 178 W. Va. 607, 363 S.E.2d 493 (1987).

What is the definition of “concealed” under the law?

“Concealed,” for purposes of W. Va. Code § 61-7-1, et seq., means: 

hidden from ordinary observation so as to prevent disclosure or recognition. A deadly weapon is concealed when it is carried on or about the person in such a manner that another person in the ordinary course of events would not be placed on notice that the deadly weapon was being carried. For purposes of concealed handgun licensees, a licensee shall be deemed to be carrying on or about his or her person while in or on a motor vehicle if the firearm is located in a storage area in or on the motor vehicle. 

Exceptions:

  1.  West Virginia’s constitutional carry law applies only to persons physically within the State of West Virginia.  It does not authorize any person to carry in another state.
  2. It does not apply to persons under the age of 21, even if they are otherwise eligible to possess a firearm.

18-21 year olds:

Just how is freedom denied to 18-21 year olds who have fought and died in foreign wars for the politicians who restricted their God-given rights?

  1. WV residents from 18-20 years of age who are not otherwise prohibited by law may obtain a “Provisional License” to carry a concealed pistol/handgun (ONLY- no nunchucks,etc.) for a total cost of $40.00.  It will be valid until the person turns 21.
  2. NOTE: The provisional license only applies to pistols or revolvers. Other concealed deadly weapons (such as brass knuckles, knives longer than 3.5″, clubs, ASPs, etc…) may result in arrest, fine, and jail time. An 18-20 year old who carries any concealed deadly weapon without a license will face a year in jail and a $1000 fine, and could find themselves disqualified for firearms ownership in the future. The same penalty applies to an 18-20 year old who carries a concealed deadly weapon other than a handgun, even if they have a provisional license. 21+ persons are allowed to carry deadly weapons other than firearms concealed, provided that weapon is legal to possess, and that they are not prohibited by law from possessing firearms. Disqualified persons (felony convictions, etc..) who carry concealed deadly weapons of any kind face severe criminal penalties.
  3. 18-20 year old members of the United States Armed Forces, Reserves, and National Guard may carry concealed handguns without a license. NOTE: This does not cover deadly weapons other than handguns. Knives with blades longer than 3.5″, switchblades, dirks, ASPs, etc… are NOT covered under this section. Handguns only. See: §61-7-6.

  4. Persons between the ages of 18 and 21 in lawful possession of a rearm are not prohibited from carrying an unconcealed rearm (“open carry”) without a provisional license as long as the person obeys all other applicable laws and restrictions.

 

“Prohibited Persons” from owning a firearm under West Virginia law:

Under West Virginia law, individuals falling within the following categories are prohibited from possessing a firearm: 

–  Has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a    term  exceeding one year;

–  Is habitually addicted to alcohol;

–  Is an unlawful user of or habitually addicted to any controlled substance;

–  Has been adjudicated to be mentally incompetent or who has been              involuntarily committed to a mental institution

–  Is an alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States;

–  Has been discharged from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions;

–  Is subject to a domestic violence protective order (provided the DVP prohibits    possession of firearms/ammunition; note that an emergency, ex parte domestic    violence protective order must prohibit the respondent from possessing a    firearm);

–  Has been convicted of a misdemeanor offense of assault or battery either    under state or federal law which the victim was a current or former spouse or    sexual or intimate partner, person with whom the defendant has a child in    common, person with whom the defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent    or guardian, the defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s    household at the time of the offense or has been convicted in any court of any    jurisdiction of a comparable misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

W. Va. Code 61-7-7(a)(1)-(8) (2016).

Temporary Personal Safety Orders:

West Virginia also recently enacted W. Va. Code Section 53-8-5, which provides for “temporary personal safety orders”, which are essentially domestic violence protective orders for petitioners who are not related to the respondents.  PSOs are available where the respondent alleges sexual offenses, stalking (W. Va. Code Section 61-2-9(a)), or repeated credible threats of bodily injury (W. Va. Code Section 53-8-4).  A PSO may prohibit the respondent from possessing a firearm if a weapon was used or threatened to be used in the commission of the offense; or the respondent has violated any previous order; or the respondent has been convicted of an offense involving the use of a firearm. See W. Va. Code Section 53-8-5.  These orders can be in effect up to two years.

For more information, see the Attorney General’s handbook:

https://ago.wv.gov/gunreciprocity/Documents/On%20The%20Mark.pdf

 

 

Open-Carry of Firearms in WV in 2019: “Am I being detained?”

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This is the current state of open-carry law in West Virginia (in my opinion), and it’s tricky relationship with a police officer’s right to do a “Terry” frisk under certain instances, as of February of 2019. Note: government lawyers do, and will, disagree with my analysis.  But mine’s supported by the law. However, proceed at your own risk, and the law may change after I write this, especially since litigation is ongoing….

1. If you’re in a vehicle, and an officer has a suspicion you may be armed, or sees that you’re open-carrying, you may be frisked and temporarily disarmed; 

2. If you’re not in a vehicle subject to a traffic stop, a police officer must have some reasonable articulable suspicion that you are engaged in criminal activity in order to seize and disarm you. Open-carrying a firearm alone is not justifiable suspicion to perform an investigative detention, unless the officer has information that you are a prohibited person unable to possess a firearm.

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Many of you have probably seen the recent lawsuit I’ve been involved with in the Michael Walker v. Putnam County case where we sued over the violation of Mr. Walker’s right to open carry a firearm in West Virginia.

The defense from the government so far is that they are allowed to perform what’s called a “Terry” stop and frisk when they see someone with a gun.  Just to clarify the law, since they obviously misunderstood then, and continue to misunderstand.

A person’s Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution to be free from unreasonable search and seizure are triggered whenever a “seizure” occurs.

When does a seizure occur?

A person is “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if, “ ‘in view of all [of] the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Specific factors to consider in determining whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave include: (i) the number of police officers present at the scene; (ii) whether the police officers were in uniform; (iii) whether the police officers displayed their weapons; (iv) whether they “touched the defendant or made any attempt to physically block his departure or restrain his movement”; (v) “the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled”; (vi) whether the officers informed the defendant that they suspected him of “illegal activity rather than treating the encounter as ‘routine’ in nature”; and (vii) “whether, if the officer requested from the defendant … some form of official identification, the officer promptly returned it.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870; Gray, 883 F.2d at 322–23.

The Fourth Circuit has noted that though not dispositive, “the retention of a citizen’s identification or other personal property or effects is highly material under the totality of the circumstances analysis.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 538 (2013) (citing Weaver, 282 F.3d at 310 (emphasis added)). In Black, the Court found that, “[i]t is clear that when Officer Zastrow expressly told Black he could not leave, Black was already seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Black at 538 (emphasis original).

When can a “seizure” be legal as a justified “Terry” Stop and Frisk under Terry v. Ohio?

Federal case law has long been clear that the police officers cannot perform a “Terry stop” of a person lawfully open-carrying a firearm for the purposes of checking his ID and running a background check to determine whether the person is a prohibited person, or to otherwise disarm him, without more.  Although brief encounters between police and citizens require no objective justification, United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002), it is clearly established that an investigatory detention of a citizen by an officer must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). 

To be lawful, a Terry stop “must be supported at least by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity.” Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).  The level of suspicion must be a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 152 (4th Cir. 2009).  As such, “the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has already made it very clear that in states where open carry is legal, such as West Virginia, if officers have no individualized information that a particular individual who is lawfully open-carrying is a prohibited person, the mere exercise of their rights by open-carrying “cannot justify an investigatory detention.”  Indeed, the Court held that “Permitting such a justification would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (2013) (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993)).

Occupants of a vehicle subject to a lawful traffic stop are a different analysis altogether, and are more likely to be subject to a Terry seizure.  An officer who makes a lawful traffic stop and who has a reasonable suspicion that one of the automobile’s occupants is armed may frisk that individual for the officer’s protection and the safety of everyone on the scene. Robinson at 696 (2017 case) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 112, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).

The importance of the Black case to open-carry rights in our circuit:

In 2013, Judge Gregory of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, whom I have had the honor of appearing in front of, issued an opinion in the case of United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (2013), which is central to the rights of West Virginians to open carry firearms.  Although that case was from North Carolina, it applies equally here.  In his opinion, he admonished law enforcement for regularly abusing the Terry Stop procedure to violate the rights of lawful gun owners:

At least four times in 2011, we admonished against the Government’s misuse of innocent facts as indicia of suspicious activity. See United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d 180 (4th Cir.2011); Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480;United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir.2011); and United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir.2011). Although factors “susceptible of innocent explanation,” when taken together, may “form a particularized and objective basis” for reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277–78, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), this is not such a case. Instead, we encounter yet another situation where the Government attempts to meet its Terry burden by patching together a set of innocent, suspicion-free facts, which cannot rationally be relied on to establish reasonable suspicion. 

…

Second, Gates’ prior arrest history cannot be a logical basis for a reasonable, particularized suspicion as to Black. Without more, Gates’ prior arrest history in itself is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion as to Gates, much less Black. See Powell, 666 F.3d at 188 (“[A] prior criminal record is not, standing alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, we “ha[ve] repeatedly emphasized that to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571, 574 (4th Cir.1998) (quotation marks and alterations omitted) (emphasis added). In other words, the suspicious facts must be specific and particular to the individual seized. Exceptions to the individualized suspicion requirement “have been upheld only in ‘certain limited circumstances,’ where the search is justified by ‘special needs’ ”—that is, concerns other than crime detection—and must be justified by balancing the individual’s privacy expectations against the government interests. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308, 313, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997)); see Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665–66, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). Here, the Government has not identified any substantial interests that override Black’s interest in privacy or that suppress the normal requirement of individualized suspicion. 

Third, it is undisputed that under the laws of North Carolina, which permit its residents to openly carry firearms, see generally N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 14–415.10 to 14– 415.23, Troupe’s gun was legally possessed and displayed. The Government contends that because other laws prevent convicted felons from possessing guns, the officers could not know whether Troupe was lawfully in possession of the gun until they performed a records check. Additionally, the Government avers it would be “foolhardy” for the officers to “go about their business while allowing a stranger in their midst to possess a firearm.” We are not persuaded. 

Being a felon in possession of a firearm is not the default status. More importantly, where a state permits individuals to openly carry firearms, the exercise of this right, without more, cannot justify an investigatory detention. Permitting such a justification would eviscerate Fourth Amendment protections for lawfully armed individuals in those states. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1559 (10th Cir.1993) (emphasis added). Here, Troupe’s lawful display of his lawfully possessed firearm cannot be the justification for Troupe’s detention. See St. John v. McColley, 653 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M.2009) (finding no reasonable suspicion where the plaintiff arrived at a movie theater openly carrying a holstered handgun, an act which is legal in the State of New Mexico.) That the officer had never seen anyone in this particular division openly carry a weapon also fails to justify reasonable suspicion. From our understanding of the laws of North Carolina, its laws apply uniformly and without exception in every single division, and every part of the state. Thus, the officer’s observation is irrational and fails to give rise to reasonable suspicion. To hold otherwise would be to give the judicial imprimatur to the dichotomy in the intrusion of constitutional protections. 

United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (2013).

 

West Virginia Lawyer Charged in Relation to Shooting

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Apparently a West Virginia lawyer was charged with being an accessory after-the-fact in relation to a New Year’s Eve shooting in Charleston, which is a felony.  This was reported by WCHS, as well as the Charleston Gazette.  Allegedly, after his friend shot a guy after an argument over ordering a pizza, the lawyer took the guy’s cell phone and instructed him to run.  And then he was allegedly uncooperative with police when they asked him the identity of the shooter.

It was reported that all of this can be viewed on surveillance footage:

“Conrad is in trouble, because police said he can clearly be seen on surveillance video taking Underwood’s cell phone, which is considered evidence, from the scene and telling the suspect to run.”

So my initial thought is, how can you view what someone is saying on surveillance footage?  You can’t.  We pretty much know the footage does not contain audio – since that in itself would constitute felony illegal wiretapping in West Virginia, since it would be capturing conversations for which no party has consented.

The police are the first to complain about surveillance footage when they are accused of misconduct, noting that you can’t tell everything from the video.  Well you certainly cannot tell what someone is saying to another.  How does a video prove that the lawyer was instructing the shooter to flee? And if you can view the cell phone being handed to the lawyer, how can you tell that the lawyer asked for it.  And if a cell phone is handed to you in such a situation, does that make you a felon?  What if you are a lawyer potentially representing the individual.  Can you preserve evidence yourself?  Are you compelled to turn over your own evidence to police at their demand?  The West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure don’t provide for that.  In fact, a criminal defendant is not compelled to provide discovery to the prosecution until and unless he or she requests discovery from the State.

As with any of the decaying “cities” in this country where you have arrogant and hypocritical leadership, the City of Charleston was quick to jump into attention-whore mode and to engage in their first attempts at poisoning the jury pool:

“It’s really surprising that someone in a position of authority, and all that he is responsible for, to participate in this criminal conduct,” Lt. Steve Cooper, with Charleston police said. 

. . .

Charleston Mayor Danny Jones said he plans to file an ethics complaint with the state bar, against Conrad.

What ever happened to “innocent until proven guilty”?  Is it ethical for a police officer, or mayor, to go onto TV and tell the public that an individual who has been charged, and who is presumed innocent, has committed criminal conduct?  Or that the individual has abused a position of authority?  Or that the person is unethical?

I’m not passing judgment on the lawyer’s actions one way or the other since I don’t know all of the facts.  After all, isn’t that what police say when one of their own are accused of misconduct?  Well, it’s under investigation and we don’t know all of the facts.  So what if he did take the guy’s cell phone and told him to run?  What negative consequences did that have?  Who is a victim to the lawyer’s alleged crime?  None and nobody.

WV gun owner stops home invasion. When can you legally shoot someone?

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There was an article yesterday in the Charleston Gazette about a gun owner in Logan, WV who stopped a home invasion in progress at his neighbor’s home.

He shot one of the burglars, and held the other at gunpoint until police arrived.  This brings up a common topic of interest to people – especially in West Virginia, which has one of the largest percentages of gun owners per capita (we are no. 5 I believe).

When can you legally shoot someone in a home invasion scenario?  

In the end, it comes down to whether or not you reasonably believe that you, or someone else (anyone else – it doesn’t have to be a family member) is in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.  People tend to get obsessed with the “castle doctrine.”  Just understand that to mean, that if you are in your home, you have no legal obligation to run out the back door, if given the opportunity.  It all comes down to whether you believe you, or someone else, is going to be killed or seriously hurt if you don’t take action.

There is no guarantee that, even if you do believe you’re about to be killed, and you fire your weapon, that the shooting will be deemed justified.  Your fear must have been reasonable – based on something that your peers would likely also consider as significant enough to cause them fear as well.

Everyone should think about these types of things ahead of time.  You should draw a mental line in the sand regarding when you shoot, and when you do not shoot.  What is enough?  What if someone in a ski mask is lurking outside your house?  What if someone in a ski mask is outside your house with a gun in their hand?  What if someone is burglarizing your vehicle in your driveway?  What if someone is burglarizing your neighbor’s home?  Or car?

There is not necessarily a right answer for these types of scenarios.  But you should never pull the trigger unless you really do fear for a life.  It’s not that they don’t deserve a dirt nap.  If it were up to me, all thieves entering your property at night should be executed.  But unfortunately it’s not.

Many people in West Virginia do believe that if someone is breaking into their car at night, that they can run outside and shoot them.  Unfortunately, here we are not allowed to use deadly force in order to protect property.  For this reason, electric companies are not supposed to keep lines active for the sole purpose of deterring trespassers.  Now if the car burglar approaches you, or if he has a weapon and has the imminent ability to use it against you – that is different.

1.  It’s always going to be more difficult to justify a shooting where the person shot was “unarmed”.  I knife, gun, or even a stick could count as a weapon.  It is never a good idea to provide your own weapon after the shooting.  The facts are what they are.  Never try to change them.

2.  It’s always going to be more difficult to justify a shooting where the person shot was shot in the back.  This would indicate that the person was walking, or running, away from you.  That causes a problem because at that point it’s hard to argue that your fear was reasonable when the threat was leaving.  It’s also hard to argue that the threat was imminent.  But, if the person shot was in your house, it’s probably going to be a good shoot, because the threat was still in your home.  Generally when we shoot someone, our natural tendency is to keep shooting.  So there have been cases where the first shot was in the front of the person’s body, and several more shots went into the guy’s back as he turned to run away.  Good shoot, but bullets in the back are always going to make things more difficult.

3.  In your home, it’s game on.  Like I said, draw a line in the sand.  If someone maliciously invades your home, you generally can eliminate the threat with extreme prejudice.  But it still has to be reasonable.  You wouldn’t want to shoot a drunk neighbor who wandered in the wrong house – or a family member sneaking back in from a night of partying.  For this reason, always have a good home defense light.  You have to know your target – and what’s behind it.

It’s outside the home, where most of the grey areas live.  So be very careful venturing outside your castle with a gun in the dark of night.  Know where your line in the sand is.

As for the shooting in the article, the 800 pound gorilla is the fact that was left out of the story.  Did the shooter believe that the neighbors were in the home at the time he saw the attempted home invasion?  If so, good shoot.  If not, he may have a more difficult time due to the fact that we are not allowed to use deadly force in order to protect (only) property.

4.  Lastly, all gun owners who anticipate ever having to use their firearms in self defense should get some formal training, such as in a defensive handgun class.  A basic concealed weapons class does not qualify as training.  This is me at a handgun class a couple of weeks ago.  It’s a lot of fun, and it’s part of our obligation as citizens under the 2nd Amendment.

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Fourth Circuit Open Carry Decision

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The Fourth Circuit issued a decision bolstering our 2nd Amendment rights.  The case is styled  USA v. Nathaniel Black, out of the Western District of North Carolina.  Essentially, a guy who was a convicted felon was open carrying a firearm.  He was then seized by police, who were subsequently able to determine that he was not allowed to possess a firearm.  But, was it an unconstitutional seizure since they didn’t know before they seized the guy that he was committing a crime by possessing a firearm?

The 4th Circuit held that it was unconstitutional to seize the man merely because they observed him with a holstered handgun, since they had no reason to believe that he was legally barred from possessing firearms, or that he was engaging in any other illegal activity.  The importance of this decision is that it protects our 2nd Amendment rights.  If it is legal for us to openly carry a handgun, then law enforcement is unable to seize us in order to determine our criminal record, harass us, etc.  The case has all the goodies when it comes to search and seizure case law in the Fourth Circuit (WV, VA, NC, MD).

Anti-gun and Ignorant West Virginia News Anchor Educated on the 2nd Amendment

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This video is great.  It shows the anti-gun and ignorant Bray Cary, with the State Journal, absolutely owned by Keith Morgan, of the West Virginia Citizens Defense League.  Bravo!

 

 

The State Journal’s website offered this promo for the segment:

DECISION MAKERS: Bray Cary takes on the gun rights debate

On this week’s edition of The State Journal’s Decision Makers, host Bray Cary takes on the need for semi-automatic weapons with Keith Morgan with the West Virginia Citizens Defense League.

Thank you Mr. Cary for taking on our “need” for semi-automatic weapons.  I hope you learned something in your embarrassing display of ignorance and arrogance.  While you’re at it, are there other constitutional rights you feel that we don’t need?  Do we really need the First Amendment with people like you on television?